In January 1969, João Saldanha took the helm as Brazil’s national football coach. With only a brief tenure at Botafogo over a decade ago, Saldanha was not a traditional coach. He was a renowned football journalist renowned for his engaging style, effortlessly communicating the intricacies of the game in a clear and relatable manner. However, he was also known for his larger-than-life personality and claimed to have played pivotal roles in key historical events, often aligned with international communism. Ironically, during the peak of Brazil’s military dictatorship, a communist was chosen to lead the national squad.
João Havelange, the head of Brazil’s sports confederation, had a strategic vision. He eliminated the distractions and power struggles that had surrounded the team. Saldanha’s first decisive action was to declare his starting lineup without any room for debate. This authoritative approach proved effective as Brazil smoothly progressed through the qualification process for the 1970 World Cup.
However, Saldanha’s journey to Mexico was fraught with challenges. His political affiliations raised suspicions among the authorities in Brasília, and his unpredictable behavior further complicated matters. Reports of him brandishing a gun and being seen intoxicated in public did not help his cause. Ultimately, the decision to replace him was pragmatic; his outdated 4-2-4 formation, effective against teams like Venezuela, seemed inadequate for the challenges of Mexico. His final matches as coach included two friendlies against Argentina, where a 2-1 victory was overshadowed by a prior 2-0 defeat and a deteriorating relationship with Pelé.
Following Saldanha’s dismissal, Mario Zagallo, a figure celebrated for his previous successes in 1958 and 1962, stepped in. He recounted years later, “I did not have a fixed plan, but I recognized that changes were essential, especially regarding the 4-2-4 formation.” Before addressing tactical changes, Zagallo prioritized mending his relationship with Pelé.
In retrospect, it seems extraordinary that Pelé might not have participated in the World Cup in Mexico. Saldanha had made disparaging remarks about him, suggesting that Pelé’s place on the team was due to financial factors and questioning his physical fitness. Aymore Moreira, who supported Saldanha, wrote an article asserting, “I, too, would have dropped Pelé,” citing structural issues within the team as the root cause.
Otto Glória, who had previously managed Portugal in 1966, was also a contender to succeed Saldanha. He stated, “Given his current form, Pelé would not fit into my squad. He is not contributing defensively or supporting the midfield.” A survey in Placar, a newly established football magazine, revealed that many fans were in favor of dropping Pelé, with support ranging from 27% in São Paulo to 59% in Minas Gerais.
Zagallo sought to quell these concerns early on. During the initial training session, he reassured Pelé of his critical role, declaring that the team would consist of “Pelé and 10 others.” However, a significant challenge lay ahead—determining who those ten players would be. Zagallo was fortunate to have ample time on the training ground to cultivate the optimal team dynamic.
Addressing defensive concerns was paramount. Wilson Piazza was repositioned from midfield to enhance quality, allowing the young Clodoaldo to step in as a dynamic box-to-box midfielder. His vigorous playing style would create opportunities for Gérson, the team’s masterful playmaker. Although Zagallo initially favored Paulo César on the left wing, when that strategy faltered, he brought in Rivellino, a natural central midfielder, to play as a false left-winger. This adjustment raised concerns about the team’s left flank, especially after the steady but limited Everaldo replaced the more talented yet inconsistent Marco Antônio at left-back. Fortunately, the left-footed Tostão could drift wide as needed.
Tostão and Pelé had developed a rapport during the qualifiers. Nonetheless, Zagallo was initially hesitant, believing they were too similar in style. He sought a classic center-forward and included several players of that mold in the squad. However, Tostão, having recovered from a detached retina, proved to be technically gifted and sharp-minded, making him an ideal partner for Pelé, who required a quick-thinking teammate. Although Tostão later described himself as “slow and offering little threat to the goal,” their collaboration thrived, particularly with Jairzinho’s ability to penetrate the defense from the right wing.
The main issue was how to establish a solid defense. The absence of seasoned players like Hilderaldo Bellini, Mauro Ramos, and Orlando Peçanha was felt. Zagallo’s approach was to adopt a compact formation, leaving only Tostão forward while Jairzinho, Pelé, and Rivellino contributed defensively, supporting Clodoaldo and Gérson. The strategy involved retreating as a unit behind the ball, which Zagallo referred to as a 4-5-1 setup.
While Brazil made significant tactical advancements, their physical preparation also evolved considerably. The nation has long recognized the importance of physical conditioning. One of Havelange’s missteps in 1966 was hiring a martial arts expert instead of a football specialist. Now, they positioned themselves at the forefront of preparation once again.
The military regime that took control of Brazil in 1964 forged a powerful alliance with technocrats, which significantly impacted the national team’s readiness for Mexico. The technocrats embraced data-driven approaches to physical conditioning, believing that measurable factors could be effectively managed. With military backing and even some influence from NASA, Pelé and his teammates were meticulously prepared for the challenges posed by the intense summer heat in Guadalajara and the high altitude of Mexico City. This commitment was evident as Brazil became the first team to arrive for the tournament, with Zagallo vowing they would be the last to leave. Once the matches began, would they fulfill his ambitious promises?
This is an edited excerpt from “Mundiales: A South American History of the World Cup” (Pitch Publishing) by Mark Biram and Tim Vickery. To support the Guardian, purchase a copy at guardianbookshop.com. Delivery fees may apply.
